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1. INTRODUCTION 
The firm is a real entity and not an imaginary, fictitious or linguistic entity. This implies 
that the firm as a whole exhibits a sufficient degree of unity or cohesiveness and is 
durable and persistent through time. The firm is essentially composed of a particular 
combination of constituents that are bound together by something that acts as an 
“ontological glue,” and is therefore non-reducible to other more basic entities, i.e., to its 
parts or its members. From our perspective, the firm is not simply an aggregate or a 
collection. It is a real integrated entity and a dynamic causal system. Institutional and 
organizational aspects enter the picture. These assertions stand in sharp contrast with 
mainstream theories of the firm whose proponents are more preoccupied with questions 
of contractual provisions, vertical integration or opportunism than the general and more 
fundamental questions related to what firms really are.  
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The dominant contractual paradigm establishes the nature of the firm as a “nexus 
of contracts” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or a “collection of assets” (Hart and Moore, 
1990), and further questioning of these constructs is left out of most, if not all, 
mainstream papers on the theory of the firm. When Cheung (1983: 3) claims that “we 
do not know what the firm is – nor is it vital to know,” we are left with a simple 
“shorthand description” of a set of contractual relations. When Jensen and Meckling 
(1976: 311) brush off the question by stating that the firm is simply a “legal fiction,” we 
are left with a “word” with as little substantive content as words referring to imaginary 
creatures. It is the object of this chapter to provide the theoretical grounds for rejecting 
these views. Firms are real entities that need to be theoretically treated as such. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the main 
tenets and variations of the dominant theories of the firm before discussing some central 
problems related to the underlying ontological status of the firm. We claim that these 
views are so strong in denying the existence of the firm that they can hardly be said to 
be theories of the firm. Given that these theories are modern revivals of some old views, 
we revisit the turn-of-the-century debates in Section 3 in order to reconsider the merits 
of various alternative entity theories, adopting an analytical rather than historical 
perspective. Building on these insights, Section 4 provides some building blocks for a 
theory of the firm as a real entity. We argue that such a theory needs to overcome the 
impasse of reductionism and account for the firm’s cohesiveness and durability through 
time. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss some implications of our analysis for the theory 
of the firm and apply some of our arguments to multi-unit structures such as corporate 
groups and vertical forms of network organization.  
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2. THE DOMINANT THEORIES OF THE FIRM IN ECONOMIC 
THEORY  
Our interest in this section lies mainly in synthesizing the “nexus of contracts” and 
“collection of assets” views of the firm, that are without a doubt the dominant views in 
economic theory. Arguably, the nexus of contracts view is also strongly established in 
corporate law theory. We therefore ignore other mainstream theories of the firm. We 
examine the underlying ontological status of the firm in the nexus of contracts and 
collection of assets views, and argue that both conceptions lack a meaningful theory of 
the nature of the firm. Their ontological individualism implies that anything other than 
individuals, their contractual relations and their assets is merely fantasy. This 
assessment paves the way for an alternative theory of the firm discussed in Sections 3 
and 4.  
2.1 The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts  
The modern nexus of contracts theory of the firm goes back to Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972: 794) according to whom “the essence of the classical firm is … a contractual 
structure.” Picking up on this insight, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 310) agree that 
“contractual relations are the essence of the firm.” In short, when “the firm is viewed as 
a set of contracts” (Fama, 1980: 289), it is not “vital to know” what the firm is since 
“the word ‘firm’ is simply a shorthand description of a way to organize activities under 
contractual arrangements” (Cheung, 1983: 3). In other words, “what is called a firm is a 
special set of contracts among owners of resources used in the coalition” (Alchian, 
  4 
1984: 34). Clearly, if the firm is seen as a “set of contracts,” then the firm must also be 
seen as a set of individuals entering those explicit and implicit contracts.  
The firm is thus conceptualized both as a set of contracts and as a “coalition” or 
an “association” between resources owners working more or less as a team. In fact, 
teamwork and contractual coalition arguably boil down to the same thing: “Does the 
essence of the ‘firm’ lie in teamwork or in the nexus of long-term contracts (i.e., 
agreements restraining the behavior of transactors)? … Teamwork always involves such 
contracts. We … can think of neither significant nor interesting cases where teamwork 
does not create dependencies calling for contractual restraints” (Alchian and 
Woodward, 1988: 70). Given that contracts restrain opportunistic individuals, contracts 
are the essential feature of the firm. Of course, given the ubiquity of contract, other 
forms of association as well as market transactions are said to be contractual.  
Thus, contrary to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm-market dichotomy and 
Williamson’s (1991) attempt to analyze “discrete forms,” Jensen and Meckling (1976: 
311) state that “it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are 
‘inside’ the firm … from those things that are ‘outside’ of it.” This makes sense from 
the nexus of contracts view, insofar as the world is regarded as a contractual continuum. 
Forms of economic organization differ only in degree since they all share the same 
contractual essence. Indeed, the contractual theory “makes the boundary of the firm 
fuzzy: a bright line distinguishing ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is missing” (Alchian and 
Woodward, 1988: 76). On this conception of the world, “aspects of firm-like contractual 
arrangements brush aside the question of absolutes – ‘When is a nexus of contracts a 
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firm?’ – and substitute instead a question of relatives – ‘When is a nexus of contracts 
more firm-like?’” (Demsetz, 1988: 155, emphasis in original). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 310-311) stress that “it is important to recognize that 
most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals … The private corporation or firm is 
simply one form of legal fiction” (emphasis in original). Thus, when contractarians 
claim that the firm is the “common signatory of a group of contracts” (Hansmann, 1996: 
18), they are referring to nothing more than a convenient “legal fiction,” understood as 
“the artificial construct under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as 
individuals” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 310, n.12). But in no sense should the firm be 
really viewed as such. Only individuals can have objective functions, can own and 
invest in assets, negotiate and sign contracts. It makes no sense to speak of the 
“behavior” of firms since firms are not individuals and only individuals can act, whether 
responsibly or not.2 It should be clear that “the ‘personhood’ of a corporation is a matter 
of convenience rather than reality” (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991: 11). 
In this context, Easterbrook and Fischel’s (1985: 89) much-cited discussion of 
limited liability reminds us that “the liability of ‘the corporation’ is limited by the fact 
that the corporation is not real. It is no more than a name for a complex set of contracts 
among managers, workers, and contributors of capital. It has no existence independent 
of these relations.” Whatever the expression used, i.e., “firm,” “corporation,” “nexus of 
contracts,” or “legal person,” for contractarians these are no more than shorthand ways 
of referring to individuals and their relations. Whether an “association” or a “coalition,” 
the firm is the sum or aggregate of its individual members. In this sense, “it is not silly 
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to consider the entry of a new stockholder to be the creation of a new firm” (Alchian, 
1984: 47, emphasis in original). In dissolving the firm and dismissing it as a fiction, 
nexus of contracts theorists mean that shareholders own the corporate assets.3 
2.2 The Firm as a Collection of Non-Human Assets  
We now turn to the second mainstream conception of the firm according to which the 
firm is a collection of non-human assets. Our presentation of this approach is quite brief 
because the views of Grossman, Hart and Moore are simply stated when one has in 
mind the nexus of contracts point of view. Bluntly put, Grossman and Hart (1986: 693) 
“define a firm to consist of those assets that it owns or over which is has control.” In 
this spirit, when looking for the firm in the web of contractual relations, the rule is 
simple: “identify a firm with the assets it possesses” (Hart and Moore, 1990: 1120). 
This property rights view of the firm excludes human assets or human capital since 
human assets are inalienable, i.e., cannot be bought or sold.  
Such a statement of the nature of the firm as a collection of non-human assets 
contrasts with the nexus of contracts view, which “does less to resolve the questions of 
what a firm is than to shift the terms of the debate” (Hart, 1989: 1764). Here, the 
boundaries question is intimately linked to the nature of the firm question. Indeed, “one 
can … sidestep the issue entirely, by arguing that everything is contractual, and that 
firms are a mirage [i.e.,] they are simply ‘standard-form’ contracts … But if firms are a 
mirage, it is difficult to explain the enormous resources that firms expend merging and 
breaking up” (Moore, 1992: 494). Thus, property rights are essential to the theory of the 
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firm since they provide an account of firm boundaries: assets that belong to the firm are 
“inside” firm boundaries and assets that do not are “outside.”  
In Hart and Moore’s (1990) analysis, agents form coalitions depending on the 
expected value of their participation which in turn depends on the effects of asset 
ownership. However, whereas in the nexus of contracts view, the firm is the central 
contracting party and thus ensures the connection between the asset owners composing 
the coalition, in the theory of the firm as a collection of assets, the link is different. 
Since “a firm is identified with the collection of physical assets over which the owner … 
has the residual control rights” (Moore, 1992: 496, emphasis in original), the link is the 
concentration of property rights in the hands of one agent. The coalition of owners 
disappears and we are left with “the owner” that personifies the aggregate of owners. 
What, then, is the link between the owner and the other agents necessary for 
production? The existence of such a link is a critical aspect of a theory of the firm and 
Hart (1995: 57) rightly underlines that “without something to hold the firm together, the 
firm is just a phantom.” According to the theory of the firm as a collection of assets, the 
answer is obvious:  
A firm’s nonhuman assets … simply represent the glue that keeps 
the firm together … If such assets do not exist, then it is not clear 
what keeps the firm together … One would expect firms without 
at least some significant nonhuman assets to be flimsy and 
unstable entities, constantly subject to the possibility of break-up 
or dissolution. My impression is that the (causal) evidence is not 
inconsistent with this view. (Hart, 1995: 57-59).  
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The owner exercises control over nonhuman assets and this leads to an indirect control 
of human assets. The glue that ensures the link between human assets and the 
nonhuman assets, i.e., the firm, is thus one based on the exclusion and exit rights of the 
assets’ owner: employers have considerable leverage by virtue of owning the nonhuman 
assets that workers need in order to be productive. We do not further develop the logic 
of the model since our interest lies in the nature of the firm. We pick up on the matter of 
the “glue” below. 
2.3 Underlying Ontological Commitments  
The preceding theories of the firm present some serious theoretical problems. Indeed, 
both views lack an adequate theory of the nature of the firm. In what follows, we make 
apparent the ontological commitments of these theories: either they make an outright 
denial of the existence of the firm, or they explain away the firm completely by 
concentrating on individuals. Commenting on the widespread adoption of the nexus of 
contracts view, Bratton (1989a: 409) writes: “some have accorded this notion the weight 
of scientific truth: It has been received in the legal literature as an ontological discovery 
with immediate and significant implications for corporate law discourse.” Ironically, the 
“ontological discovery” is that the firm is a “fiction,” i.e., that it does not really exist.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311) admit that the firm in their presentation has 
“little substantive content.” There is no point to mark out “firm boundaries,” since the 
concept itself makes little or no sense in a world that is a contractual continuum. The 
only possible difference between observed forms of organization is a difference in 
degree. There can be no differences in nature if the essence of everything is identical. 
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The “firm” can be no more than the by-product of the study of contractual relations. 
This sort of reasoning is straightforward in denying the firm ontological status although 
it relies on notions of “firm-likeness” which beg a definition of the firm that should 
logically preexist. Fundamentally, the whole cannot be significantly different from the 
sum or aggregate of its parts. Indeed, if the firm does not exist apart in any way from its 
constituent parts, be these individuals, contracts and/or assets, then the issue of 
comparing the whole with the sum of the parts makes little sense.  
A further problem of intellectual coherence can also be raised. If the world is a 
contractual continuum, which of the existing or possible contracts are those that define 
or belong to a particular firm? The reasoning cannot escape circularity since one cannot 
identify a nexus of contracts independently of a given firm. Surely, a firm cannot 
consist of all those contracts that are linked to the firm because that “would be like 
saying that a zebra is a nexus of stripes linked to a zebra” (Eisenberg, 1999: 830). The 
same is logically true of the collection of assets view of the firm that holds that a zebra 
is a collection of stripes owned by a zebra. Crucially, there is no essential difference, or 
difference in nature, between an individual owner of one asset and an individual owner 
of several assets, or between one asset and a set of assets. All individuals are owners of 
some assets. Are all individuals “firms”? Likewise, is any non-human asset a “firm”? 
To use Eisenberg’s words again, it would be like saying that a zebra is a collection of 
stripes and that a one stripe is a zebra. 
Can a “collection” of X count as the “nature” of Y? Hart (1995) needs a theory of 
something that can act as the “glue” because without it the firm is “just a phantom.” 
Hart is correct. Without the glue, a “collection of assets” is no different from a heap of 
  10 
sand easily blown away on a windy day. Heaps of sand composed of random grains of 
sand are indeed “flimsy and unstable entities, constantly subject to the possibility of 
break-up or dissolution” (Hart, 1995: 58-59). Yet Hart’s idea of the glue is poor. If “a 
firm’s nonhuman assets … simply represent the glue that keeps the firm together” 
(ibid.: 57), then the answer to the question “what is a firm?” is “a collection of non-
human assets” and that the answer to the question “what holds the firm together?” is “a 
collection of non-human assets.” Regardless of this logical problem, surely, the threat of 
exclusion alone cannot account for whatever holds the firm together and points more to 
the (potential) dissolution of the firm than to its (actual) unity. Far from being the sort of 
thing that could bind anything together, a collection is itself in need of being bound 
together if it is to form a whole.  
Our critical assessment of the nexus of contracts and collection of assets stories 
thus reveals that these are in no meaningful sense theories of the nature of the firm. 
Therefore, both views cannot be said to be theories of the firm. Both are theories of 
“collections” of some sort and not of “firms.” Words such as “firm” may be used in 
order to facilitate discussions with the layman or even with the specialist, but the word 
“firm” refers to sets of individuals, contracts and/or assets and is simply used for 
convenience. Firms exist only linguistically or conceptually. Firms are dissolved and 
dismissed as fictions. Contractual theorists in general and those cited in particular are 
ontological individualists. Anything can and everything should be reduced to 
individuals. 
Firms do not act. Firms do not have intentions or objective functions. Their 
“behavior’ is like the behavior of the market … We seldom fall into the trap of 
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characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error 
by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and 
intentions” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 50). This comparison with the impersonally 
efficient market is supposed to make economists think twice before ever again 
committing the error of thinking that the firm is an individual. However, to say that the 
firm is an “individual” is different from saying that it is a “person” in that the latter is a 
moral and legal term. Corporate personality may indeed be a legal fiction but 
individuality implies that firms may be said to distinctly exist and act in a unified sort of 
way – not that the corporation is an individual. This line of inquiry is important for our 
discussion throughout the rest of this chapter in which we seek to build an alternative 
theory of the firm as a real and not fictitious or linguistic entity. 
3. FROM FICTIONS AND AGGREGATES TO REAL ENTITIES 
We have argued that the nexus of contracts and collection of assets theories fail as 
theories of the nature of the firm. Given that both views are modern revivals of some 
old debates that have been evolving in a cyclical fashion for many centuries (Avi-Yonah 
and Sivan, this volume), a number of contemporary critics of current mainstream have 
called for the revival of the entity theory of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century (e.g., 
Blair, 1999; Smith, 2001).4 Reviving real entity theory is also our task in this section. 
Keeping in mind that “history offers ideas and approaches that are better and worse, and 
[that] the most recent is not always the best” (Smith, 2001: 72), instead of tackling the 
debate from a general historical perspective, we adopt an analytical perspective that 
seeks to disentangle the ontological from the normative aspects involved. We first 
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underline the links between fiction, aggregate and property conceptions of the 
corporation before exploring the alternative entity view.5 
3.1 Fictions and Aggregates 
In most jurisdictions in the world, the corporation is a “legal person,” a “legal entity” 
separate from the various natural persons composing it or having an interest in its 
economic activities. Legal personality means that the corporation can own assets, sign 
contracts, can sue or be sued, and so forth. However, under the doctrine of “piercing the 
corporate veil,” courts may decide to break the legal protection offered by personality if 
the mask of separate personality is used fraudulently. In such cases, the law treats the 
corporation as a fiction and makes the natural persons involved liable for corporate torts 
or debts. This doctrine seems to imply that if we pierce the corporate veil, then we find 
nothing but real individuals. Many interpret this to mean that there was no real entity to 
begin with. While these issues have traditionally been applied to “corporations,” they 
have been transposed to other types of “companies” by recent legal evolutions.6 
Accordingly, although in this section we discuss the corporation following traditional 
debates, our arguments apply more generally to all forms of companies, i.e., to the firm. 
As is well known, the “fiction theory of the corporation” is as old as Roman law 
and was often wielded by medieval canonists and civilists. The corporation was 
generally considered as an imaginary or legal being that could be nothing more than the 
individuals composing it. That this conception is closely linked to the “aggregate theory 
of the corporation” is quite obvious: since the corporation is nothing more than the 
aggregate of its real individual members, all reference to the collective corporate entity 
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is reference to a “legal fiction” that is used merely for convenience. Proponents of this 
approach believed that “the rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality 
the rights and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being” 
(Morawetz, 1882: 2). Jensen and Meckling (1976), and others, use both the fiction 
theory and the aggregate theory. Of the various possible aggregates, the aggregate of 
shareholders or owners may be called the “proprietary theory of the corporation.” Hart’s 
(1995) collection of assets view based on property rights is clearly a variant of this 
aggregate theory. In dissolving the firm and dismissing it as a fiction, contractarians 
declare that the aggregate of shareholders is the owner of the aggregate of corporate 
assets.  
These views carry direct implications for the much-debated question of how firms 
should be run. Of course, following Jensen and Meckling (1976), Butler and Ribstein 
(1989) and Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), in a private property market economy, firms 
should be run in the exclusive or at least the predominant interest of shareholders. The 
only possible answer to Dodd’s (1932) famous “For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?” question is “the shareholders.” Again, in dissolving the firm and dismissing 
it as a fiction, the basic agency model examines direct relations between the aggregate 
of shareholders and firm managers, the latter simply managing the former’s assets. A 
popular rationale for this “shareholder primacy norm” is based on the belief that the 
category “shareholders” exhibits more homogeneous interests than any other 
“stakeholders” (e.g., Hansmann, 1996) and that shareholders, as residual claimants, are 
also the main risk-bearers in the undertaking of economic activities.  
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However, Stauss (1944, reprinted in this volume) correctly criticized the 
mainstream myth of the existence of some unique class of individuals that are 
“homogenous risk-bearers” when in fact it is the firm as a whole that undertakes risky 
entrepreneurial activities. Arguably, shareholders, as defined by Hansmann, can 
themselves be considered “fictional,” a category that the proprietary conception of the 
corporation needs in order to function. In fact, “shareholders … are a legal fiction, and 
in many ways a far more problematic fiction than the corporation itself” (Greenwood, 
1996: 1025). If the law is replete with fictions, what makes any one of them so special? 
The underlying ontological individualism of the dominant theory explains why 
shareholders are considered “more real” than corporations since corporations are said to 
exist only linguistically or conceptually.7  
Many of those who today invoke the entity theory of some hundred years ago do 
so with the intent to influence the current corporate governance debate. Thus, entity 
sympathizers often remind us that managers legally owe fiduciary duty to the 
corporation itself rather than to the shareholders, that it is the corporation as a legal 
entity that owns corporate assets rather than the shareholders directly, and that no one 
owns the corporation (e.g., Blair, 1995; Greenwood, 1996; Iwai, 1999; Ireland, 1999; 
Stout, 2004). Alongside these explicit legal features against the dismissal of 
corporations as fictions, the more general “stakeholder theory of the corporation” (e.g., 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995) reminds us that individuals and groups of individuals 
other than shareholders are also part of the economic nexus and that running the firm in 
the sole interests of shareholder value is insufficient. In its crude version, stakeholder 
theory is a form of aggregate theory that simply denies the supremacy of the proprietary 
  15 
conception. In a more elaborate version, stakeholder theory views the corporation as a 
“social entity” or institution having social responsibilities.  
Hence the general position of many proponents of corporate social responsibility 
today. Blair (1995) and Allen (2002) thus oppose two families of theories of the 
corporation, namely the “property theory of the corporation” which underlies the current 
shareholder primacy norm and the “social entity theory of the corporation.” Although 
we share Blair’s (1999) view that the entity theories of some hundred years ago need to 
be revived, we depart from the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
debates and seek analytical insights for a theory of the firm only.8 We need to 
disentangle the ontological from the normative aspects of the real entity theory. We 
agree with Smith (2001: 71) who believes that “in the decades ahead, economists and 
legal scholars will become more sophisticated in their appreciation of human groups 
and of social forms such as corporations.” This is precisely why we seek to provide 
some building blocks for a theory of the firm as a real entity. In what follows, we 
suggest the revival of entity theory through Freund’s (1897) major but neglected work. 
3.2 Reviving Real Entity Theory 
The aggregate and fiction theories of the corporation of the turn-of-the-century were 
much criticized by authors influenced by Continental theories of “real corporate 
personality” associated with Hegelian legal theorists such as Gierke. Expressions such 
as “the personality of the corporation … is in no sense … artificial or fictitious, but is 
every whit as real and natural as is the personality of man” (Maitland, 1900: 335-36), or 
“a corporation is an entity – not imaginary or fictitious, but real, not artificial but 
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natural” (Machen, 1911: 262) became quite common. As opposed to the fiction theory, 
the “real entity theory of the corporation,” also called the “natural entity theory of the 
corporation,” holds that the corporation not only exists separately from its members but 
also can literally be said to act and have “volition.” As opposed to the proprietary 
theory, the corporation’s being “person” implies that it cannot be considered an object 
of property rights.  
Some entity theorists had larger preoccupations than the specific legal form of the 
corporation, extending their analysis to unincorporated bodies (Maitland, 1903) or to 
associations and partnerships, all seen as “more than the aggregate of [their] members” 
(Rowley, 1931: 560). From this point of view, the firm’s existence has nothing to do 
with the law. The law simply complies with the fact of its existence and attributes legal 
capacity, i.e., recognition inside a particular legal system, to an already existing 
economic capacity, i.e., regardless of the legal system. Machen (1911: 261) thus states: 
“A corporation exists as an objectively real entity … The law merely recognizes and 
gives legal effect to the existence of this entity. To confound legal recognition of 
existing facts with creation of facts is an error.” In the same spirit, Laski (1916: 422) 
claims that “the entities the law must recognise are those which act as such, for to act in 
unified fashion is – formality apart – to act as a corporation.” In this sense, this 
movement was in search of a realistic approach regardless of legal form.9 Berle’s (1947, 
reprinted in this volume) theory of “enterprise entity” as different from “corporate 
entity” is an important later contribution to this approach.  
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In order to revive the entity theory, it is necessary to isolate these ontological 
aspects from the ever-present issue of corporate personality. Many entity theorists 
conflated “reality” and “naturalness” and accorded excessive weight to the “personality” 
of this natural entity. In fact, most debates and most of the confusion arose and still 
arise from the thorny issue of corporate personality. Therefore, given that corporate 
existence and corporate personality are all too often equated, this is the first issue that 
needs to be dealt with. We need to go beyond the fallacious assumption that if a 
collective entity is said to be treated in legal terms as a “legal person” this means that 
the collective entity is a person (Hodgson, 2002). Recall that Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) dismiss the firm as a fiction on the grounds that its personality is a fiction. Yet 
legal fictions need not be ontological fictions (Dejnožka, 2006). It is also important to 
note that what the law treats as “person” does not necessarily or effectively correspond 
to “human being” or “individual.”  
Fundamentally, the term “person” derives from the Latin persona and the Greek 
prosopa meaning “mask” in a dramatic representation. More precisely, “person” can 
refer to the mask worn by an actor, the actor behind the mask or the actor-in-the-mask. 
In his discussion of Vining’s (1978) theory of “legal identity,” Dejnožka (2006: 30) 
points out that “courts treat legal persons as human-beings-in-persons, corresponding to 
actors-in-masks. If [so], the legal persons are more than masks or roles. They are human 
beings in masks or roles. And a corporate person is a group of human beings in a 
collective mask or role.” Such a collective mask is a social institution and this can be 
said without moral or normative intentions or preconceptions. What is behind the mask 
of legal identity is a real complex entity. This holds for all legal forms of business 
companies. 
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Reviving entity theory also involves steering away from ideas of “organisms” and 
“groups souls” or “vital forces” that various entity theorists pronounced. It should be 
equally clear that our task is not to establish the “ultimate moral unit” sought by 
Maitland (1905) and many others. Rather, closer in spirit to Laski and Rowley, we need 
a causally grounded theory and not a morally grounded theory. Ontology is independent 
from and logically precedes the normative question. We are looking for a theory of the 
firm as “a relatively coherent and stable whole” since this is in effect our working 
definition of a real entity. In this context, Freund (1897) has had surprisingly few 
commentators, considering that his theory rejects the fiction and aggregate views of the 
corporation while avoiding the pitfalls of organicism and does not share the normative 
bent of other writers of his time.  
Although speaking from the legalistic perspective, in an actually ontological and 
therefore morally neutral spirit, Freund (1897: 47) lists three “salient characteristics of 
the body corporate: its unity, its distinctiveness and its identity in succession.” All three 
derive from a “representation principle” that is needed, according to Freund, in order to 
acknowledge the existence of higher-level rights and agency as opposed to individual 
rights and agency. In a nutshell, the representation principle is that corporate 
organization and corporate rules bind individual agency in such a way that one can 
properly speak of corporate unity, distinctiveness and retention of identity through 
change. For Freund, if these salient features are in fact present in a given association, 
one can speak of a real entity. The difficulty is to show how common purpose and 
collective action produce a level of unity, distinctiveness and identity sufficient for a 
corporation to be a real entity without appealing to any literally volitional or moral 
features. Freund says: 
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The association becomes visible and active in and through 
individuals only, but the common purpose, the concerted action, 
and the combined resources, produce upon our mind the 
impression, that the association itself enjoys something like the 
power of individual personal agency. The resulting conception is 
not one of absolute unity, such as the German jurists demand … 
but a relative unity … There is no absolute objective test by 
which we could be forced to allow or deny the character of unity 
to an aggregate body of human persons. The analogy of 
composite things explains perfectly the nature of the association. 
(Freund, 1897: 77) 
Freund rightly insists on the unity of complex wholes composed of human and non-
human integrated parts. His analysis analogizes corporations to composite artifacts. His 
theory of the reality of the whole as not literally an agent but as a causally interacting 
composite of agents and non-agents is consistent with the (literally false) 
phenomenological impression that the association itself enjoys the power of agency. 
Freund’s three features of the corporation are what Rowley (1931) and much later 
Khalil (1997) called “individuality.” We prefer Freund’s original terms. It is important 
to understand that this composite unity may be imperfect at times and that this is 
something that the law may or may not capture. The group’s organization may or may 
not have the relative unity or wholeness that allows one to properly speak of collective 
action.  
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The form and exercise of intra-association control are both essential elements of a 
theory of collective action. But while the power to act as a group is an essential element 
of the whole’s reality, there is no need to suppose that there exists some sort of supra-
individual or metaphysical “soul” or “vital force” of the corporation. In sum, Freund’s 
(1897) approach paves the way for our analysis below which takes further theoretical 
steps. Stauss’ (1944: 112, reprinted in this volume) subtle position is equally relevant as 
a point of departure of our own theory: “the entity known … as the firm is taken as a 
real institution. As such the firm exists apart from the individuals who compose its 
decision-making organization, but it does not function apart from them. Thus the entity 
is not a fiction; it is a fact” (emphasis in original). Generally speaking, “the entity 
commonly known as ‘corporate entity’ takes its being from the reality of the underlying 
enterprise, formed or in formation” (Berle, 1947: 344, reprinted in this volume). This 
applies to all legal forms of business companies. 
4. BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A THEORY OF THE FIRM AS A 
REAL ENTITY  
Based on our preceding revival of entity theory through Freund’s (1897) important 
work, our present task is to further develop a theory of the firm as a real entity. In the 
spirit of Weissman (2000), Mäki (2001) and Bunge (2003), we believe that economic 
ontology must include firms as fundamental wholes non-reducible to other more basic 
entities, i.e., to their parts or members. We argue that various forms of reductionism are 
untenable when theorizing firms and other complex human organizations. The firm as a 
real complex entity is at least as real as its members (Dejnožka, 2006). From an 
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ontological point of view, the key issues are parts-whole relations, unity, wholeness, 
cohesiveness, persistence, durability, identity and distinctiveness. From an economic 
point of view, the directly related issues include collective action, institutions, 
organization, managed economic system, competence, knowledge stickiness and 
heterogeneity. From a legal point of view, the issues are substance over form or real 
enterprise over legal entity. In arguing against reductionism we provide a theory of the 
“ontological glue” that accounts for the firm’s cohesiveness and durability through time. 
4.1 Beyond Reductionism  
Firms are not simply sets of contracts or collections of assets. The firm is not an 
epiphenomenon. To reduce the firm to its constituent parts “is no more reasonable than 
is treating a human being as no more than the chemicals that make her up” (Greenwood, 
2005: 15). Although mereological relations, i.e., complex parts-whole processes, need 
to be part of a theory of the firm, we reject “mereological essentialism” (Chisholm, 
1973) that holds that parts are essential to their wholes in the sense that the whole is 
determined by the parts. This is a typically reductionist position since the whole does 
not exist independently of its parts and any modification of the parts implies a 
modification of the whole. Clearly, the aggregate theories discussed throughout this 
chapter, and in particular Alchian’s (1984: 47, emphasis in original) view that “it is not 
silly to consider the entry of a new stockholder to be the creation of a new firm,” are 
strictly speaking compatible with mereological essentialism. This presents a conceptual 
problem for the identity or durability of the whole through time.  
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Firms are not aggregates or “mereological sums.” The very issue of comparing the 
whole to the sum of its parts is problematic. In his discussion of the problem, Copeland 
(1927) rightly stresses that for parts or whatever to be summed together they need to be 
of the same magnitude. For example, how does one “add” individuals and non-human 
assets or artifacts? Addressing this question, Ruben (1983) argues that individuals 
cannot be said to be “parts” of social wholes since “being a part of” is a purely 
mereological relation whereas when we think of individuals as “members” of such 
wholes we have in mind a particular social relation not reducible to mereological 
relations. While we can think of non-human assets or artifacts as “parts” of firms, we 
need to admit the theoretical superiority of individuals as “members” of firms or other 
organizations since this connotes the members’ agential power through which firms 
function. In any case, the whole is reducible neither to its members (e.g., owners) nor to 
its parts (e.g., assets). 
The fact that reductionism fails as an adequate analysis of the nature of the firm 
implies that if one systematically reduces the firm as a whole to anything else one 
necessarily loses sight of a great deal of the picture. It is important to stress that firms as 
structured wholes compete with other firms as structured wholes, that firms as wholes 
can sue and be sued (even though individuals go to court as actors-in-the-mask), can 
produce and be competitive. Firms as wholes possess capabilities. Firms as wholes have 
temporal reputations in transactions and generate income or suffer losses. Firms as 
wholes undertake risk-bearing activities (Stauss, 1944, reprinted in this volume). There 
is nothing imaginary or fictitious about these facts. Actually, casual observation as well 
as many legal and accounting features support these claims. In accordance with Freund 
(1897), unity, distinctiveness and identity through succession allow one to properly 
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speak of collective capabilities, firm competitiveness, identity and reputation, and so on, 
as real properties of the firm as a real entity. Sets of contracts and collections of assets 
simply do not have any of these properties.10  
It follows that the theory of the firm cannot exclude certain important “holistic” 
aspects. This does not imply any form of determinism or collectivism that annihilates 
individual agency, since wholes do not fully determine their parts and members any 
more than parts and members fully determine wholes. It simply means that certain 
structural, functional and systemic considerations need to enter the picture. Indeed, “a 
system … is … a complex thing whose components are bound together, as a 
consequence of which the whole has peculiar properties and behaves as a unit in some 
respects” (Bunge, 2000: 148). Such “emergent properties” are properties of the whole 
not reducible to properties of its constituents. Given that emergence is by definition a 
bottom-up relation between ontological levels, it is fully relevant to the theory of the 
firm as a real entity.11 
Importantly, emergence entails novelty. As a causal process, emergence accounts 
for new properties at the emergent level. Therefore, we need to understand the crucial 
and complex links between emergent entities and their properties and lower-level 
entities and their properties. In this respect, what does it mean to say that the higher 
level entity is real? For one, this implies that it is persistent: “emergents appear as 
integrated wholes that tend to maintain some sense of identity over time” (Goldstein, 
1999: 50). For another, it implies that this higher level has some sort of causal power. 
Emergent levels exert some form of “downward causation” (see Emmeche et al., 2000) 
or a form of “reconstitutive downward causation” (Hodgson, 2003) that partly mold 
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lower levels by giving shape and purpose to the interacting constituents. Again, this 
does not mean that higher levels fully determine lower levels but that this complex two-
way causality of what may be termed “constitutive dynamics” is part of the “ontological 
glue” that keeps the whole together.  
We may summarize our position with Dejnožka’s (2006) reminder that existence 
is power for Plato: power to cause, power to stay unified, power to avoid dissolution. 
Fictitious or conceptual entities do not have such causal powers. For Leibniz, the 
stronger the unity or wholeness, the more real the entity. The stronger the unity or the 
cohesiveness of the whole, the more we move from random sets to real entities (French, 
1982; Copp, 1984; Tuomela, 1989; Dejnožka, 2006). In this sense, simple aggregates or 
random sums are to be distinguished from entities that deserve to be considered “real.” 
One may thus properly distinguish “aggregates” from “social integrates” (e.g., Pettit, 
2003; Copp, 2006). Aggregates simply do not have any of the properties of real entities. 
Given these ontological considerations, we reject the fiction theory that eliminates the 
reality of the firm as a whole and we reject the aggregate theory that reduces the whole 
to some of its members or parts. 
4.2 Cohesiveness and Durability through Time  
From a theoretical point of view, firms as wholes have human members and non-human 
parts arranged into a complex structure or interactive system. By adding precision to the 
central concept of the “glue” that holds parts and members together as a cohesive 
whole, our discussion stresses that unity, wholeness and cohesiveness as well as identity 
and durability through time are essential ingredients of a theory of real entities. In his 
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search for new foundations, Zingales (2000) feels that these issues are important but the 
ontology involved remains atomistic. An important point that reductionists miss is that 
once a certain cohesion and unity is attained, group behavior is not identical or 
reducible to the behaviors of its elements. In fact, “groups may be cohesive, which 
individuals cannot be, and cohesiveness may affect the stability of the group, which is 
again something individuals … cannot have” (Brodbeck, 1958: 16). Cohesion and unity 
can properly be said to be properties of the firm.  
From our perspective, a theory of the firm as a real entity needs to include some 
notion of “ontological glue” understood here as being at least in part a form of efficient 
causation (in Aristotle’s terms), i.e., as the complex system of upward causation and 
reconstitutive downward causation. Weissman (2000) appositely speaks of “causal 
reciprocity.” We also need to include “teleological glue” as a form of final causation 
(again, in Aristotle’s terms) manifested among other things by collective purpose and 
forward-looking behavior. The firm’s collective action capacity is reinforced by: 
“institutional glue” provided both by formal and informal rules, and by habits and 
routines; “organizational glue” manifested by structures, processes, functions and roles; 
“motivational glue” that ensures adherence to the common goal; “cognitive glue” 
accounting for shared beliefs and representations; and, finally, “productive synergy 
glue” or “competence glue” which relates to the complex co-specialization of human 
assets such as knowledge and non-human assets. All these blends of glue contribute to 
the firm’s cohesion and organize the collective action of its members, that is, the firm’s 
relative behavioral unity through time. The more the emergent whole is unified or 
integrated, the more it can and should be considered a real entity.  
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Ontological individualism is based on the commonplace that collective entities 
such as firms cannot exist without any individuals. Yet the firm’s persistence through 
time, based on the replication of behavioral patterns and collective routines, implies that 
any particular firm continues to exist even if all its present human constituents are 
progressively replaced. Such independence qualifies the firm as a real entity: “economic 
entities … actually have reality, in the sense that they are patterns which exist 
independently of their parts” (Raby, 1959: 460). Our discussion fits a crucial empirical 
and theoretical insight from the evolutionary theory of the firm, namely that collective 
knowledge is typically “sticky” and that collective competence is retained through 
progressive change in firm membership. If this were not the case, the firm would 
certainly be a flimsy entity, incapable of survival in an evolutionary setting and thus 
incapable of preventing dissolution. Indeed, in terms of the “units of selection” debate 
in evolutionary economics, “group selection operates when the individuals in the group 
are bound together in a sufficiently cohesive manner to share a mostly common fate” 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004: 300).12  
Ideas similar to those presented here can be found in the literature. For instance, 
Langlois and Foss (1997: 213) argue that firms are not held together by the “thin glue of 
transaction-cost minimization, but rather by the thicker glue of capabilities.” Kay (2000: 
704) considers that “[the] glue is likely to be found in complex strategic decisions made 
by the firm.” Likewise, philosophers such as Pettit (2003) and Copp (2006) demonstrate 
that some groups typically “collectivize reason” in many complex decision-making 
situations and that this institutionalization may act as a glue. We can thus properly 
speak of “integrates” as opposed to “aggregates.” Finally, Commons (1924) and Raby 
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(1959) both insist on what may be called a “working rules glue” combined with 
“expectational glue” characteristic of any “going concern”:  
That which holds the going concern together is [a set] of working 
rules affording an expectation of a gross income to be obtained 
jointly … If the expectation fails, the immortality fails. When the 
expectation continues, the corporation is a ‘going concern.’ For 
this reason, the legal form is subordinate. (Commons, 1924: 145). 
It is the real, ongoing collective dynamics of activity bound together by forward-looking 
behavior patterns that is the basis of many of the real entity’s properties and causal 
powers manifested by its economic process. Although legal form is subordinate to 
economic substance, as real entity theorists correctly stressed, it is important to 
understand the role played more generally by institutions, considering that the “circular, 
positive feedback from institutions to individuals and from individuals to institutions 
can help enhance the durability of the institutional unit” (Hodgson, 2003: 172).  
4.3 Institutions and Individuals  
Institutions are both constraints and resources for individuals. Institutions both depend 
on individuals and channel individuals’ behavior. Institutions depend on real acts, and 
are real because of these acts. In this respect, the problem of structure and agency 
(Swanson, 1992; Archer, 1995; Lawson, 2003; Hodgson, 2004) is an ontologically 
crucial one for social science in general and economic theory in particular. Our 
arguments in this chapter are in line with this literature’s fundamental insight that social 
reality is composed of something more than and is non-reducible to individuals. 
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Structure is a product of, a constraint on and a resource for individual and collective 
agency. One can properly speak of embodied institutional reality. Thus, in her ontology 
of institutional kinds, Thomasson (2003: 605) writes: “although they do not meet the 
[strong] realist paradigm of entities entirely independent of us for their existence and 
essence, they certainly are also not mere mental constructs.” The firm as a real 
institution exists independently of its individual members but does not function apart 
from them.  
In order to function, the firm relies on the structured dynamics of real acts of 
individuals and groups of individuals. In fact, internal organization of authority and 
competence allows one to attribute “secondary actions” to collective entities such as 
firms via “primary actions” of their individual members in specific corporate positions 
(Copp, 1979). In other words, corporations “act” through their internal decision 
structure (French, 1982). From a different perspective, Searle’s (1995) “constitutive 
rule” that “X counts as Y in context C” can be directly applied to individual and 
collective action: action X of corporate officer x counts as action Y of the firm because 
of x’s corporate position. Any consequent problem that may arise is therefore that of the 
firm as a whole as long as x acted in accordance with the “business judgment rule” or 
any other such rule. There are, therefore, ways of legally and conceptually attributing 
actions directly to the firm without “personifying” or “hypostatizing” the firm. The firm 
“acts” not literally but institutionally through actors-in-the-mask. This is similar to 
Freund’s (1897) representation principle that links individual agency to collective 
agency. 
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More fundamentally for our discussion, as a real economic entity, the firm is an 
organization comprising human members and non-human parts that can be seen as an 
active “managed economic system” (MacMillan and Farmer, 1979; Biondi, 2005). 
Inside firms, humans typically engage in various activities the composite outcomes of 
which constitute what may properly be said to be the firm’s particular productive 
activities. Intra-firm organizational and institutional structure is the complex 
combination of typically rule-based, goal-intended and forward-looking behavior. 
Although collective routines ensure the replication of outcomes, the replication is 
imperfect and this possibility, among others, introduces variation and heterogeneity in 
both organizational and productive outcomes. Accordingly, the need to maintain relative 
behavioral unity between different periods of time is essential to the firm’s coherence. 
Hence, commitment to a common goal or undertaking is crucial in order for the relative 
behavioral unity to emerge and persist through time.  
It is important to recognize that people do things together and that people inside 
firms and other organizations reason in terms of “we” and “they” (Simon, 2002). Such 
“identification is a powerful force … by virtue of the loyalty it can produce to the goals 
of the whole system” (Simon, 1991: 41, reprinted in this volume). The firm’s identity is 
an emergent cognitive property that certainly has causal powers of reconstitutive 
downward causation. The possibility of conflicts or power struggles and other incentive 
compatibility problems does not change our theoretical analysis of the nature of the firm 
as a real complex and active whole in significant ways. In fact, our analysis amplifies 
the importance of institutions in achieving the relative behavioral unity of collective 
action allowing the firm as a whole to attain its intended goals even though these may 
change or be betrayed.  
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When we say that what holds the firm together is a combination of a variety of 
types of glue, we do not mean to imply that all firms are identical in their actual unity. 
Building up this unity is a dynamic and temporal process and the stronger the 
cohesiveness or wholeness the more real the entity. Our view is thus compatible with 
Biondi’s (2005) concept of “becoming concern.” Following Simon’s (1996) discussion 
of complexity, artificiality and emergence, firms function and survive in their 
environment because they are examples of “adaptive artifice.” Given this complexity, it 
is impossible to agree with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976: 50) view that the “behavior” 
of the firm is like the behavior of the market” since the concept of “equilibrium” cannot 
apply to the firm as a whole (Biondi, 2005). The firm is not some “spontaneous order” 
guided by an “invisible hand.” 
We follow Dejnožka’s (2006) important ontological discussion in concluding that 
firms as real entities are both “interactive systems” and “complex artifacts.” As 
interactive systems, firms function through the agential power of their members. As 
artifacts, firms typically exhibit purposive design and institutionalized functional unity. 
When we say that firms are artifacts, we do not imply that they can be reduced to 
instruments in the hands of shareholders or of any other constituents, or that their design 
is flawless. We simply mean that they are non-natural entities that are a product of 
human design and deliberate action. The members’ agential power, or the deliberate 
determination of people to make their firm succeed, given certain goals and rules of 
action, is necessarily part of the ontological glue that accounts for the firm’s 
cohesiveness and durability through time. Adopting a non-reducitionist view on the 
nature of the firm does not eliminate individual agency. The contrary is quite true.   
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5. IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS  
We have theoretically outlined what it means to say that the firm is not a fiction, legal 
or otherwise, but a real entity that typically exhibits a relative degree of cohesiveness 
and durability through time. The entity is real in that it possesses causal power to resist 
dissolution – not mechanically, but through the agential power of its ongoing human 
constituents, whose real actions are organized and to some extent institutionalized. The 
firm’s ontological glue is causal, teleological, institutional, organizational, motivational, 
cognitive, expectational, and productive- or competence-based. The overall result is the 
coherence and continuity of the whole which can no longer be viewed as reducible to 
any of its constituent parts or members. It follows that reductionism and more generally 
ontological individualism lead to a failure of the theory of the firm and of other social 
organizations. The nexus of contracts and collection of assets theories of the firm fail in 
their account of the firm on the grounds provided throughout this chapter. Our 
discussion carries several implications for current debates regarding the theory of the 
firm as well as some direct applications to group regulation.  
5.1 Implications for the Theory of the Firm 
The theory of the firm is traditionally taken to be about three questions: the existence 
and nature of the firm (although these are two different questions); the boundaries of the 
firm; and the internal organization of the firm. We believe that our account of the nature 
of the firm sheds new light on what should properly be considered a fourth question of a 
theory of the firm, namely the question of firm heterogeneity. Indeed, talk of the firm’s 
distinctiveness, identity or individuality implies this fourth question. Our account of the 
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cohesiveness and wholeness of the firm also relates to the second sense of the term 
“individuality”: relative indivisibility or, put differently, relative non-decomposability. 
This does not mean that economic analysis should never take a closer look at particular 
constituents or relations. We are not denying that contracts are relevant for the theory of 
the firm. What it does mean, however, is that the whole should not be forgotten or 
explained systematically away.  
Methodological individualism, as a monist doctrine of the “unique” or “ultimate” 
mode of analysis, fails if applied systematically. Many aspects of the firm such as 
competence and knowledge that rightly should be part of a theory of the firm are 
collective or holistic in nature. Ignoring them has contributed to the failure of the 
mainstream theory of the firm. In his discussion of the current debate between the 
contractual and the competence theories of the firm, Williamson (1999: 1102) writes: 
the “troublesome argument is that of aggregation. Taking a more holistic view, the firm 
as a whole is different from and larger than the sum of the parts … Inasmuch as 
transaction cost economics purports to be interested in all regularities whatsoever, it 
stands to benefit from research in the competence tradition on holistic consequences.” 
Although we have not discussed the transaction cost economics theory of the firm as a 
“governance structure,” Williamson’s point applies in general to all contractual theories 
that hold that the contract or the transaction is the basic unit of analysis.  
 In line with a growing recent literature, we consider that combining the more 
holistic competence perspective with the contractual approach is one of the main 
challenges awaiting the theory of the firm (see Weinstein, this volume). Gibbons (2005: 
238) has expressed this view under the heading “breaking loose.” The contractual 
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approach generally examines isolated transactions such as given “make-or-buy” 
situations, ignoring the link between this specific transaction and all other economic 
activities of the firm. On the other hand, the competence perspective insists on firms as 
non-reducible dynamic wholes. As such, the firm is a productive entity, a “competent 
team” (Eliasson, 1990) and a “knowledge-creating entity” (Nonaka, Toyama and 
Nagata, 2000). It is as a whole that the firm is competitive or not. Both levels of 
individual incentives and contracts, and of collective knowledge, learning and 
competence, need to enter the picture. The question of combining the two perspectives 
on the theory of the firm is a fundamentally ontological undertaking that relies on the 
recognition that reality is multi-layered. By providing an account of the causal 
reciprocity between levels, our analysis of the cohesiveness and durability of the firm 
through time reinforces the relevance for the theory of the firm of the evolutionary 
ontology developed in the “units of selection” debate (e.g., Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2004).  
In order to further explain the heterogeneity of firms, the approach needs to rely 
on both universal and historically specific concepts and these need to be coherently 
articulated (Hodgson, 1998). We have argued that unity, cohesiveness and durability 
through time of a complex combination of members and parts are the ontological 
features of the firm as a real entity. This ontological skeleton needs to receive economic, 
legal and accounting flesh, i.e., be contextualized in terms of particular economic, legal 
or accounting attributes a specific firm has. The particular constellation of intra-firm 
and extra-firm relationships characterizing each given firm depends on historical 
circumstances (Chandler, 1992). We believe that our general theory of the firm as an 
economic entity is logically compatible with the observed varieties of capitalism, since 
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it admits indefinitely many blends and varieties of teleological, institutional and 
organizational unity. The particular type of legal entity a given firm happens to be 
provides form only, the substance of the firm being independent of legal artifice.  
5.2 Applications to Integrated Multi-Unit Structures 
Our general view according to which the stronger the unity or cohesiveness or 
wholeness, the more real the entity, has direct applications to integrated multi-unit 
structures such as business groups and vertical forms of network organization, both 
from a theoretical point of view and from the point of view of regulation. Blumberg 
(1990b, 1993) has argued at length that “enterprise law” should apply to complex 
structures such as corporate groups, meaning that law should not systematically place 
form over substance or legal entity over real enterprise (see Berle 1947, reprinted in this 
volume, and Manfrin, this volume). Indeed, applied directly, corporate law tends to see 
multiple entities instead of one whole economic enterprise. However, in terms of 
liabilities against outsiders such as tort victims or final consumers, such multi-unit 
structures need to be treated as single economic wholes. For Deakin (2003), the very 
idea of “enterprise risk” needs to be reconsidered in the light of these complex 
structures. In fact, Deakin argues, a general move towards “organizational liability” 
within tort law is needed. The implicit ontological commitment underlying these views 
is very different from the fiction and aggregate theories discussed in this chapter, since 
for contractarians such as Easterbrook and Fischel (1985: 89), “the liability of ‘the 
corporation’ is limited by the fact that the corporation is not real.” By the same token, a 
corporate group is presumably not real from this point of view.  
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The implications of our real entity theory are clear in relation to this problem. 
Internal legal independence between subsidiaries should not blind us to the fact that 
these complex structures are complex artifacts designed to compete collectively with 
other such enterprises as wholes. The fact that each unit composing the structure may or 
may not be pursuing other objectives does not change the analysis. In the same spirit, 
Orts (1998) has argued that what he calls “relational firms,” i.e., those complex 
structures that maintain internal legal autonomy while remaining more or less cohesive 
economic units, should legally be treated accordingly, depending on the question at 
hand. For Orts (1998: 313), “whether a relational firm is considered one entity or a 
group of entities will depend … on the question that is asked … If the question is 
whether a relational firm is acting as a unit in competing with other firms in markets, 
the answer will focus on the lines of authority that enable it to act as a single entity.” 
Blumberg’s corporate groups are just one form of Orts’ relational firms, one in 
which equity participation and controlling interest in subsidiaries are a major feature of 
the parts-whole relationships. Corporate groups, conglomerates and holding companies 
all share this feature in different degrees and for different purposes, varying from 
majority to minority ownership structures. The question of applying our arguments to 
multi-unit forms of economic organization that do not involve equity ownership is even 
more challenging. We have, in fact, applied some of the arguments of this chapter to 
vertical forms of network organization in which a “hub-firm” or “vertical architect firm” 
organizes production between legally independent entities (Baudry and Gindis, 2005). 
In accordance with Orts, we argued that the hub-firm’s power to control the network as 
a whole and to prevent its dissolution implies that a vertical network form of this sort 
may properly be treated as a single economic entity.  
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In all these interactive complex systems, be they single firms, business groups or 
vertical network forms of organization, the bottom line is that the stronger the unity and 
durability of action, the more real the economic entity, regardless of formal legal 
structure. The whole can be (and is) held together by the various forms of glue we have 
described and it seems trivial to state that such wholes often thrive by competing with 
each other.  
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NOTES 
                                                 
 
1 U. Lyon 2, LEFI & INSA de Lyon, STOICA. david.gindis@univ-lyon2.fr. I would 
like to thank Yuri Biondi, Jan Dejnožka and Geoffrey Hodgson for their valuable 
comments on previous versions of this essay. All remaining errors and shortcomings are 
my own. 
 
2 A point of view also adopted by Friedman (1970) and restated recently by Jensen 
(2002). Buchanan (1988: 136) thus reminds us that “the values or interests of 
individuals are the only values that matter for the quite simple reason that these are the 
only values that exist.”  
 
3 Given that the contractual association is voluntary, the firm has nothing to do with 
state grants or statutes. Summing up this position, Butler and Ribstein (1989: 768) 
celebrate the fact that “market forces have long since freed the corporation from the 
control of state legislators, and the corporation can now safely be viewed as 
fundamentally contractual.” Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) and countless other private 
ordering proponents also hold this anti-regulatory view. In this chapter, we ignore this 
normative issue and focus on the ontological commitments of the contractual theory 
only.  
 
4 For detailed presentations of the corporate entity debate in the U.S. context, see Mark 
(1987), Hovenkamp (1988), Bratton (1989b), Hager (1989), Blumberg (1990a), Millon 
(1990), Horwitz (1992), Phillips (1994), Iwai (1999) and Avi-Yonah and Sivan (this 
volume). See Teubner (1988) for a general comparative approach and Foster (2000) for 
a comparison between England and France. For detailed historical accounts of business 
economics and entity theory debates both on the Continent and in the New World, see 
Canziani and Kirat in this volume.  
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5 In this chapter, we ignore the “concession theory of the corporation” and the question 
of state involvement and focus on the “fiction vs. reality” and “aggregate vs. entity” 
issues only. 
 
6 With the advent of LLCs, LLPs, LLLPs, and so forth, limited liability is no longer a 
unique characteristic of corporations and traditional differences between partnerships 
and corporations have become less obvious. One-man limited liability companies exist 
in many jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions allow various “check-the-box” schemes for 
setting up a business where one may literally choose a menu of items from different 
statutes if their combination is the most suited for the venture. We are not interested in 
these evolutions per se but in the shift of emphasis they provoke in the debate about 
“entity” status from corporations to all forms of business companies. In this context, 
some have expressed the need for a “unified business entity code” applying to all legal 
forms (e.g., Blackwell, 1999). Private ordering proponents such as Ribstein (2003) are 
of course very critical of these calls for “entity rationalization” since this could only be 
done through regulation. 
 
7 Strikingly, however, debates often center on the “sacred cow” of corporate existence 
(Israels, 1952). Litowitz (2005: 501) writes that “from the perspective of cultural theory 
… the modern corporation is fundamentally a religious and mythological entity.” We 
have before us a battle of the gods between “the corporation” and “the shareholders.” A 
serious effort of “demystification” of the corporate entity is needed.  
 
8 See, in this volume, Rebérioux and Moore on entity theory and corporate governance, 
and Avi-Yonah and Sivan on entity theory and corporate social responsibility.  
 
9 Entity theories were themselves much criticized at the time. For instance, Singleton 
(1912: 291) considers that entity views are “ontological theories incapable of 
verification,” Wormser (1912: 496) avoids the “tempting but profitless discussion,” 
Radin (1932: 658) brushes off the debate as a “matter of literature” and Cohen (1935) 
speaks mockingly of “transcendental nonsense.” The ontological individualists 
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discussed in Section 2 are saying roughly the same thing as are aggregate theorists such 
as Morawetz (1882). 
 
10 Hart (2001: 1714) recognizes that “somehow there has to be some stickiness in the 
firm or system, so that a firm’s reputation can be separated from that of key personnel.”  
Hart’s intuition is again correct although he does not provide an adequate theory of this 
stickiness.  
 
11 This is quite different from the widely accepted thesis of “supervenience” which 
contains nothing in it to make it a necessary vertical relation (Humphreys, 1997). Even 
if applied to a vertical relation between levels, supervenience retains the ontological 
priority of the lower level: once the facts about the lower-level entities are set, so too are 
all the aggregate facts (Kincaid, 1995). There is still something missing from an 
ontological point of view. On the other hand, emergence is a failure of aggregativity 
(Wimsatt, 1997) and contains an explicit ontological commitment. 
 
12 Legally, firm members are certainly bound together since they share the common fate 
of the firm in the case of dissolution or absorption. Human asset specificity and 
knowledge and productive synergies are also by definition dependent on the firm’s 
survival since their value is greater or only exists inside the firm. 
